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Indecent Standards:
The Case of U.S. versus Weldon
Angelos
Eva S. Nilsen*

"[Wihether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual
depends, not on whether its mere mention 'shocks the
conscience and sense of justice of the people,' but on
whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes
of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty
shocking, unjust, and unacceptable."
- Justice Thurgood Marshallin Furman v. Georgia'
"While the sentence appears to be cruel, unjust and
irrational,in our system of separated powers Congress
makes the final decisions as to appropriate criminal
penalties."
-

Judge Paul Cassell in United States v. Angelos

2

* Associate Clinical Professor, Boston University School of Law; J.D.
1977, University of Virginia Law School. © 2005. Many thanks to the
Symposium participants for their critique and conversation; thanks also to
Amy Bitterman, Boston University School of Law, Juris Doctor candidate
(2007) for her superb research assistance.
1. 408 U.S. 238, 361 (1972).
2. 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2004).
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I. INTRODUCTION

In today's highly punitive culture, perhaps Weldon Angelos'
fifty-five-year sentence does not seem unusual. He's a 25-year-old
man who was convicted in December 2003 of selling marijuana,
3
possessing firearms while drug dealing, and money laundering.
The facts proven at trial are that on three occasions in June and
July, 2002, Angelos sold eight one-ounce bags of marijuana for
$350 each to a government informant. 4 The purchaser testified
that a firearm was visible during two of these drug sales. 5 Police
seized another gun from Angelos' home five months later pursuant
to a warrant. 6 At no time was he accused of using or threatening
7
to use these weapons.
If Angelos had been charged and convicted in a state court in
Utah rather than a federal court in Utah, his sentence would most
likely have been between four and seven years.8 His sentence also
would have been much less if he had accepted the prosecutor's
pre-trial offer of fifteen years in exchange for a guilty plea. At the
time of the plea offer Angelos faced only one mandatory gun
charge. Initially, he refused the offer, but then tried,
unsuccessfully, to reopen plea discussions after the prosecutor
informed him of the additional firearms indictments that he had
secured arising from the same set of facts. Angelos went to trial,
was convicted, and, on November 16, 2004, Judge Paul Cassell
imposed the mandatory sentence of fifty-five years. This was the
least severe sentence the judge could have rendered under the
federal firearms enhancement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 9 With
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 1231.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1258.
See id. at 1243, 1259; Pamela Manson, Utah Federal Judge Takes

Closer Look at Stiff Minimum Mandatory Terms, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE,

Sept. 15, 2004, at Al.
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000). "Whoever, during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced punishment if
committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which he
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a
firearm.., shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime," be sentenced to imprisonment for five
years. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A). If the firearm is a "short-barreled rifle, short-
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no opportunity for parole, this is essentially a life sentence. If he
survives, Weldon Angelos will be eighty years old when he is
released.
What's so special about this case? There are many equally
long sentences imposed daily in federal and state courts
throughout the United States. 10 However, even in these harsh
times it is unusual for a first offender, convicted of a crime not
involving violence or the threat of violence, to receive a life
sentence. The sentence in Angelos is an anomaly, and Judge
Cassell's response to having to impose the sentence makes it
special. He balked at doing what seemed to him outrageous and
unfair and set this case on an unusual procedural journey. He
called this sentencing his most difficult moment as a judge," but
he did more than express his pain and frustration. Judge Cassell
reached out to the jury, the legal community and beyond in an
effort to resolve the conflict between his sense of justice and the
law. In the end he did as many others who are equally disturbed
by the straightjacket of federal sentencing have done: he
barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten
years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is
equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for
thirty years. Id. § 924(c)(1)(B). In the case of his second or subsequent
conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for twenty-five years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a
destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler,
to life imprisonment without release. Id. § 924(c)(1)(C). Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation any person
convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment
imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of
imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried. Id. § 924 (c)(1)(D).
"For purposes of this subsection, the term 'drug trafficking crime' means any
felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et
seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et
seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et
seq.)." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). "For purposes of this subsection the term 'crime
of violence' means an offense that is a felony and (A) has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense." Id. § 924(c)(3).
10. See generally David M. Zlotnick, Shouting into the Wind: District
Court Judges and Federal Sentencing Policy, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.

645 (2004).
11. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.
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sentenced Angelos to the mandatory minimum of fifty-five years
12
in prison.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed Weldon Angelos' sentence. 13 That
Court did not seize the opportunity presented by Judge Cassell to
expand Eighth Amendment discourse. 14 Furthermore it rejected
Judge Cassell's interpretation of Harmelin v. Michigan and his
findings under the Harmelin standard.15 Weldon Angelos was not
6
re-sentenced to a term proportionate to his crimes.'
This case has broader import, however, than the attempt to
12. See Interview by PBS Frontline with Judge Robert Sweet, FRONTLINE
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/procon/sweet.
(n.d.),
html (last visited Jan. 16, 2006). Some judges have quit the bench because
they could no longer abide by the sentencing laws. Examples include: Judge
Lawrence Irving, as reported by Allen Abrahamson, U.S. Judge to Quit; Cites
Sentencing Guidelines, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1990, at A3; Judge Paul
Magnuson, as reported by Lucy Quinlivan, Chief Judge Leaving Best Job in
World, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June 18, 2001, at Al; Judge John S. Martin,
as reported by Seth Stern, Federal Judges Rebel Over Limits to Sentencing
Power, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jul. 8, 2003 at Op. 2.

13. United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 754 (10th Cir. 2006).
14. See id. at 738-54.
15.

See id.

The Harmelin standard was set forth in Harmelin v.

Michigan. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). The Harmelin Court held that a life sentence
without the possibility of parole for possession of a large quantity of cocaine
was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 961, 994. Justice
Kennedy relied on the gross proportionality test articulated in Solem v. Helm,
which asserted that "as a matter of principle ... a criminal sentence must be
proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted." 463
U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (cited by Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05). Harmelin's
threshold test consists of line-drawing regarding the seriousness of a crime
and the culpability of the offender. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 976. Judge Cassell
found this an easy test for Angelos: 1) the lack of violence or force in
Angelos's crimes despite his carrying a gun, 2) the fact that he sold
marijuana, a drug which despite its illegality is not generally associated with
violence or serious bodily harm, and 3) Angelos's lack of a criminal record.
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1257-58. As noted above, the Supreme Court has
said that most of those serving sentences will not survive the threshold test
of gross disproportionality. Harmelin, 501 U.S at 960. The Court gave scant
guidance when it said, for example, that a life sentence for a parking meter
violation is grossly disproportionate. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274
n.11 (1980). Before Harmelin, the Supreme Court's modern Eighth
Amendment test was articulated in Solem. 463 U.S. at 277.
16. See infra text accompanying note 138 for a brief description of the
Tenth Circuit's decision on appeal, which occurred just prior to publication.
Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's decision, the analysis and commentary
set forth by this article remain useful should Weldon Angelos undertake
another appeal, and remain useful to other defendants similarly situated to
Angelos.
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right the wrong done to Weldon Angelos. Judge Cassell's
ambitious approach to the restrictions of mandatory sentences
shows that judges can generate valuable data on evolving
standards of decency and thereby give content to the Eighth
Amendment. Judge Cassell's actions may augur a new wave of
judicial decision-writing in which judges record their observations
about evolving sentencing norms and in so doing expand the postBooker sentencing discussion to include mandatory minimums. 17
II. PRE-SENTENCE INQUIRY

At the time of Angelos' trial, Judge Cassell had been on the
bench approximately two-and-a-half years. Prior to his
appointment to the District Court he was a law professor at the
University of Utah College of Law,' 8 where he accumulated an
extensive scholarly record. 19 He also spent a number of years
prosecuting cases in the Justice Department after having spent
two terms working as a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice
Warren Burger and then D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Antonin Scalia. 20 Cassell has a reputation for being scholarly,
2
conservative and practical. '
During the period between verdict and sentencing in Angelos,

Judge Cassell did two unusual things. First, he ordered the
parties to submit briefs on the application and constitutionality of
the particular mandatory minimum sentencing laws. 22 This move
17. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005) (finding that the
Guidelines unconstitutionally invaded the province of the jury by permitting
judges to find sentencing enhancement facts by a preponderance of the
evidence and making the Guidelines mandatory).
18. Biography of Paul G. Cassell, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, Feb. 20, 2004 (last updated), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/cassellbio.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
19. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's
Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898 (2001); Paul G. Cassell, Too
Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (And a Critique of
Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (2004).
20. Biography of Paul G. Cassell, supra note 18; Resume of Paul G.
Cassell, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, Feb. 20, 2004 (last
updated), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/cassellresume.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2006).
21. See Support of Paul G. Cassell, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, Feb. 20, 2004 (last updated), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/cassell
support.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); Order Directing Briefing on Application and
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was unexpected as there appeared to be little sentencing leeway
under the federal law. The issues flagged by the Court for briefing
can be summarized as follows:
1. Is there a conflict between the general sentencing
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that prescribes sentences that are
not greater than necessary to insure justice, deterrence and public
protection, and mandatory, consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C.
23
§ 924(c), and if so how should it be resolved?
2. Are the mandatory minimum sentences in this case
violative of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, taking into consideration Harmelin v.
Michigan's holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentences
that are grossly disproportionate to the crime, 24 and Ewing v.
California's reiteration of the Harmelin test in the context of
25
California's three-strikes law?

3. Are the mandatory minimums violative of the prohibition
Fourteenth
under the
classifications
against
irrational
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause based on what others in
the same Guidelines category (I) would receive? 26 Judge Cassell
listed a number of examples:
27
a. Angelos will serve a prison term of at least 738 months.
b. A major drug kingpin whose drug distribution causes death
or serious bodily injury will serve a term of no more than 293
months. 28
c. An aircraft hijacker will serve no more than 293 months,
and fewer months will be served by a racist assaulter, a terrorist
who detonates a bomb, a spy, a second degree murderer, a
kidnapper, someone who assaults with intent to kill and inflicts
permanent or life threatening injuries, a rapist, a child

Constitutionality of Mandatory Minimum Sentences at 10, United States v.
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004) (02-CR-708) [hereinafter Order
Directing Briefing].
23. Order Directing Briefing, supra note 22, at 2-3.
24. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991).
25. Order Directing Briefing, supra note 22, at 3-5; Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (upholding twenty-five years to life sentence under
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1999)).
26. Order Directing Briefing, supra note 22, at 5.
27. Id. This is a combined sentence of 660 months for the firearms
charges and 78 months (6.5 years) for the marijuana sales.
28. Id.
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pornographer, and a saboteur. 29
Judge Cassell also asked whether it should matter that
Angelos would receive a much shorter sentence if he were being
sentenced in any of the fifty states. 30
Cassell's other unusual pre-sentencing move was to send
former Angelos trial jurors a questionnaire entitled "Juror
Questionnaire Regarding Weldon Angelos Sentencing."31 He said
"[Tihe sentencing of Mr. Angelos is scheduled for March 26, 2004,
at 2:30 in my court. I am trying to gather as much information as
possible in order to determine the appropriate sentence in the
matter. It occurred to me that you had heard all of the evidence in
the case and might have informed views on the subject." 32 He
assured them that any response was purely voluntary, promised
anonymity, and stated that the poll would be valuable as a
reflection of the informed thoughts of the people of Utah on the
seriousness of the crime and possible penalties. 33 Nine of the
twelve former jurors responded to the questionnaire expressing
divergent views about the appropriate sentence, with the average
suggested term of years between fifteen and eighteen years. 34
III. FORMER JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS WEIGH IN

Judge Cassell was soon to receive even more information for
the upcoming sentencing of Weldon Angelos. Former federal judge
John Martin led an amicus campaign on behalf of Weldon
Angelos. 35 Twenty-nine former federal judges and prosecutors
29. Id. at 5-9.
30. Id. at 9.
31. Juror Questionnaire Regarding Weldon Angelos Sentencing, United
States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004) (02-CR-708) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Juror Questionaire].
32. Id. Judge Cassell asked the jurors to write down a term of years that
they personally believed Angelos deserved to serve. Id. To assist them, he
explained that due to truth in sentencing law, Angelos would serve the entire
sentence. Id. Additionally, he informed them that Angelos had no adult
criminal record and one minor juvenile adjudication. Id.
33. Id.
34. The results of Judge Cassell's questionnaire asking jurors' opinions
about Angelos's deserved sentence were as follows: 5, 5-7, 10, 10, 15, 15, 1520, 32, and 50. See Letter from Judge Cassell to Attorneys Lund and Mooney
(Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with author).
35. Brief of Amici Curiae Addressing the Constitutionality of Mandatory
Minimum Sentences Under Federal Law, United States v. Angelos, 345 F.
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signed the amicus brief asking Judge Cassell to find, among other
things, that the mandatory minimum sentence of fifty-five years
36
was cruel and unusual punishment.
Amici did not argue that mandatory sentencing is a per se
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Rather, they argued, the fiftyfive year sentence was both grossly disproportionate to Mr.
Angelos' crimes and contrary to society's evolving standards of
decency. 37 The amicus analysis relied on the Supreme Court's
recognition that there is a proportionality requirement for noncapital as well as for capital offenses consisting of a three-part test
that courts must conduct. 38 The test requires a defendant to pass
a threshold that measures the sentence against the seriousness of
the crime and the culpability of the defendant. 39 If successful, and
it has been stated on several occasions that only rarely will a
defendant be so fortunate, 40 the court conducts inter- and intrajurisdictional sentence comparisons. 41 Amici argued that Angelos
met Harmelin's threshold test because he had no prior adult
criminal record, and the conduct for which he was convicted

Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004) (No. 02-CR-708) [hereinafter Brief of Amici
Curiae].

36. The signatories of this amicus brief included former Attorney General

Nicholas Katzenbach, former Third Circuit Chief Judge John Gibbons, former
District Judge John Martin, attorneys Harry Rimm and Jeffrey Sklaroff, and
former U.S. Attorney Robert J. Cleary. Id.
37. Id. at 4. In addition to the Eighth Amendment claim, the authors
argued that the mandatory sentence violated due process, the separation of
powers doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment because under this system the
prosecutors were allowed to pick the charges, make offers of leniency, further
increase the charges after the offer was refused and stack the sentences. Id.
at 15, 18-19, 24. This meant that Angelos could get what is effectively a life
sentence for conduct that was much less serious than many crimes of violence
which carried lighter sentences.
38. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20, 22 (2003); Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997, 1004 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring and
acknowledging that Solem v. Helm considered three factors to determine
disproportionality).
39. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring and citing
Solem v. Helm for threshold requirement).
40. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 21, 30; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 960, 963, 1001,
1005.
41. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 36 (Breyer, J., dissenting but agreeing that the
sentence at issue should be compared to other sentences if the claim satisfies
the threshold requirement); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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involved neither the use nor the threat of violence. 42 In measuring
the seriousness of Angelos' crimes, Amici considered the jury's
assessment, the ABA standards on punishment, 43 and the
Kennedy Commission recommendation urging federal and state
44
repeal of mandatory minimum sentences.
Amici also urged the Court, when looking at crime severity, to
consider that the drug sold here was marijuana, not cocaine, a
drug which has associated harms that influenced the Court in
Harmelin.45 This case stands alone, they argued, in its severity
and its injustice. Amici urged Judge Cassell to do both the just
and legally correct thing and decline to sentence Angelos to the
mandatory term because it violated the Eighth Amendment and
46
because the prosecutor misapplied 28 U.S.C. § 924(c).
III. SENTENCING

On November 16, 2004, Judge Cassell sentenced Weldon
Angelos to fifty-five years on the three firearms charges - the
mandatory sentence - and one day on all charges related to the
three marijuana sales.47 The one-day sentence was permissible
because these charges were covered under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines which, since Booker,48 were no longer mandatory. 49 The
42. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 35, at 9-10.
43. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING 18-2.4, 183.21(b) (3d ed. 1994). "A legislature should not prescribe a minimum term of
total confinement for any offense." Id. at 18-3.21(b). The authors state 1) that
sentences should be rationally related to the gravity of the underlying
offense, 2) sentences should be no more severe than necessary to achieve
their purpose, id. at 18-2.4 cmt., and 3) a minimum mandatory punishment
generally should not be the equivalent of a life sentence, id. at 18-3.21(b) cmt.
Reports
with
Commission
Kennedy
ABA
Justice
44. See
Recommendation to the ABA House of Delegates (A.B.A. 2004) (reports and
recommendations to the House of Delegates regarding criminal punishment).
Justice Kennedy's speech several years ago urging repeal of mandatory
sentences based on their unjust application throughout the criminal justice
system led to the formation of the ABA Kennedy Commission which issued a
number of recommendations to lessen the harshness of current sentencing.
Id. at 1, 3-4. Among these is the recommendation to abolish mandatory
minimum sentencing and return sentencing discretion to judges. Id. at iii.
45. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 35, at 9.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
48. United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 743 (2005).
49. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1260 (citing United States v. Croxford,
324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1248 (D. Utah 2004)).
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judge acknowledged that were it not for the fifty-five-year (638
months) mandatory sentence he would have given Angelos a
sentence of 97-121 months (8-10 years) for his drug and firearms
charges.5 0
Judge Cassell's sixty-five page opinion is remarkable in its
legal and factual detail. He addressed two constitutional claims:
first that the § 924(c) charges created irrational classifications
under the Equal Protection Clause, and, second, that a fifty-fiveyear minimum mandatory sentence was excessive punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.51 He harshly criticized the
prosecutor's choice to stack the firearms charges in one
prosecution of § 924(c), stating that Congress had originally
intended this to be a standard recidivist provision, requiring a
conviction before a second enhanced sentence can be given. 52
53

A. Equal Protection Claim

The gist of the equal protection argument is that sentencing
Angelos under § 924(c) to what amounts to a life sentence is
irrational as applied to him, because it leads to unjust and
undeserved punishment and creates irrational distinctions
between offenses and offenders. The court agreed that, in light of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the jury's opinion, the probation
officer's assessment of the probable sentence under Utah state
laws, the laws of the fifty states, and the practice of other federal
jurisdictions, § 924(c) resulted in an irrational sentence for
Weldon Angelos.5 4 Judge Cassell then examined whether § 924(c)
created irrational classifications between offenses and offenders.
50. Id. at 1241.
51. Id. at 1243-52, 1256-59.
52. Id. at 1234.
53. Judge Cassell's opinion and Angelos's brief address the Equal
Protection arguments with as much vigor as they do the Eighth Amendment
arguments. For purposes of this paper I have chosen to focus on the Eighth
Amendment mainly because the strength of the Equal Protection argument
lies in its characterization of the § 924(c) sentence as unjust and irrational
punishment when compared to other offenses. This argument involves line
drawing regarding punishment severity in much the same way as does the
proportionality based argument. See id. at 1243-1248; See also Brief of
Appellant Weldon Angelos at 43, United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738,
2006 WL 41211 (10th Cir. Jan. 9, 2006) (No. 04-4282) [hereinafter Brief of
Appellant Angelos].
54. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1241-43.
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While Angelos' likely maximum sentence was 738 months, a major
drug kingpin who killed someone could get 293 months, an
aircraft hijacker could receive 293 months, one who rapes a child
could receive 135 months; a second degree murderer could receive
168 months, and a marijuana dealer who shoots an innocent
person during a drug transaction could receive 146 months.55
The government argued that the mere fact of Angelos'
possession of a gun indicated that the threat of violence was
present.56 The court agreed but asked whether it was rational to
punish a person who might shoot someone with a gun he carried
far more harshly than the person who actually does shoot or harm
57
someone.
The government conceded that some of the offenses cited by
the Court were indeed more serious that those committed by Mr.
Angelos but argued that it was wrong to compare Angelos' three
gun offenses with only one other serious crime. 58 The Court
countered by comparing Angelos' sentence with the same list of
crimes, times three.5 9 This meant that Angelos' sentence would be
longer than that of any three-time criminal "[w]ith the sole
exception of a marijuana dealer who shoots three people."60 His
sentence, however, would be longer than that of a marijuana
dealer who shoots two people. 61 As appellate counsel for Angelos
concluded, "the difference between Mr. Angelos' sentence and
those for exceptionally violent federal offenders is both stark and
62
disturbing."
The Court also discussed whether the statute was irrational
because it failed to distinguish between first offenders and
recidivists. 63 However, this failure to distinguish was upheld in
Deal v. United States which found that the phrase "subsequent
55. Id. at 1245 (table 1 Comparison of Mr. Angelos' Sentence with
Federal Sentences for Other Crimes). These comparisons troubled Judge
Cassell prompting one of his pre-sentence queries to counsel.
56. This discussion mirrors concerns raised by Judge Cassell in the presentence period. See Order Directing Briefing, supra note 22.
57. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1258.
58. Id. at 1246.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Brief of Appellant Angelos, supra note 53, at 27.
63. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
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conviction" allowed a defendant to be given the enhanced
punishment for a second conviction (or more) resulting from
offenses tried together. 64 The court said there was no requirement
that the second or subsequent crime happened after the first
conviction. 65 This so-called "count-stacking" has been sharply
criticized by lawyers, academics and members of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission.66 Judge Cassell opined that the
deterrence rationale generally given for recidivist statutes is not
served by a statute that permits multiple consecutive sentences
without offering an opportunity to the guilty party to be
67
deterred.
64. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 135 (1993). Deal raised an
ambiguity in the statute rather than a specific Eighth Amendment challenge
to § 924(c). Id. at 131. What is unusual about this statute is that it permits
the sentences for multiple events to be stacked as consecutive sentences in a
single prosecution. In Deal multiple robberies occurring on separate days
were tried in one proceeding. Id. at 130. The Supreme Court said there was
no requirement that enhancements be charged at separate judicial
proceedings. Id. at 137. The Court found no ambiguity, saying there was no
requirement that the previous sentence be final before another offense could
be charged. Id. at 132, 135. The Court did not, however, consider facts such
as are present in Angelos, that is, whether stacking charges that resulted in
multiple twenty-five-year sentences for a first offender violated the Eighth
Amendment.
65. Id. at 135.
66. See John R. Steer, Member and Vice Chair of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Statement Before the ABA Justice Kennedy Commission (Nov.
13, 2003). "[Clonsider the effects if prosecutors pursued every possible count
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) .... The statute provides for minimum consecutive
sentence enhancements of 25 years to life for the second and subsequent
convictions under the statute, even if all the counts are charged, convicted,
and sentenced at the same time. Pursuing multiple § 924(c) charges at the
same time has been called 'count stacking' and has resulted in sentences of
life imprisonment (or aggregate sentences for a term of years far exceeding
life expectancy) for some offenders with little or no criminal history." Id.
67. Judge Cassell, in his sentencing opinion, states that "[1]ast year in
Ewing v. California,the Supreme Court upheld a twenty-five to life sentence
under California's three-strikes law. While defendant Ewing's third offense
was merely stealing $399 worth of golf equipment, the controlling opinion
noted that the policy of the law was to 'incapacitat[e] and deter[] repeat
offenders who threaten the public safety. The law was designed 'to ensure
longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a
felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony
offenses.'" In the end, the Court concluded that Ewing's sentence was
justified 'by his own long, serious criminal record [including] numerous
misdemeanor and felony offenses ... nine separate terms of incarceration...

and crimes [committed] while on probation or parole."' Angelos, 345 F. Supp.
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Judge Cassell strongly criticized other aspects of the
government's handling of this case. He criticized the practice of
seeking superseding indictments after the defendant refused to
accept an offered plea bargain. 68 He found flaws in the
government's rationale for charging Angelos with a mandatory
fifty-five-year penalty after it had offered him a deal for fifteen
years, noting that Angelos became neither more dangerous nor
more blameworthy during the negotiation process.6 9 He also
pointed out that seeking such a harsh sentence was clearly the
prosecutor's choice and not one dictated by the Department of
Justice. 70 Nevertheless, the court reluctantly stated that since the
punishment is up to Congress, it survives rational basis scrutiny.
"While it imposes unjust punishment and creates irrational
71
classifications, there is a 'plausible reason' for Congress' action."
B. Eighth Amendment Claim
The court was nearly persuaded by the Eighth Amendment
argument. Judge Cassell found the mandatory sentence grossly
disproportionate to that deserved based on typical factors used by
courts to determine the seriousness of a crime and the culpability
of its perpetrator: his lack of prior record, his failure to use or
threaten violence in committing his crimes, the nature of the
crimes, and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines sentence for these
crimes (which would be applicable - as advisory only - if there

2d. at 1249 (quoting Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15, 30 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE §
667(b) (West 2005)).
68. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.
69. Id. at 1254-56.
70. In support of this he cites the "Ashcroft memo" which demanded that
prosecutors seek higher sentences with greater consistency. Id. at 1253. Yet
even under these stringent Justice Department guidelines the Angelos
prosecution stands out as being unduly harsh inasmuch as the memo was
directed to crimes of violence, not drug crimes, especially where no weapon
was used or threatened.
71. Id. at 1256. Query whether the "any plausible reason" test would
allow any punishment whatsoever, since, of course, one can always come up
with a plausible reason. If this is truly the test, what role does the court play
as guardian of the Constitution? Appellate counsel makes this point,
criticizing Judge Cassell's "undue deference to an irrational legislative
scheme that implicates the judicial branch's core duty of criminal sentencing
and entails incomparable consequences for the individual defendant." Brief of
Appellant Angelos, supra note 53, at 8.
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were no mandatory minimum sentence). 72 The court then
considered the remaining two steps in the Harmelin test:
comparison to penalties for other offenses in the court's
jurisdiction, and comparisons to sentences for the same crimes in
other jurisdictions. The court concluded that "[hiaving analyzed
the three Harmelin factors, [it] believes that they lead to the
conclusion that Mr. Angelos' sentence violates the Eighth
73
Amendment."
Why, then, after all this careful parsing of the law and facts,
and after concluding repeatedly that this punishment was cruel,
extremely unusual, undeserved and irrational, does the Court
refuse to find this sentence unconstitutional? The court got stuck
on a 1983 Supreme Court case, Hutto v.Davis,74 that, while not
specifically overruled, has dubious viability today. 75 The Court
reasoned that if a pair of twenty-year consecutive sentences for
possessing nine ounces of marijuana was not cruel and unusual,
as Hutto held, then neither was the mandatory sentence for
Angelos. 76 Indeed several justices referred to it recently as still
part of Eighth Amendment doctrine. 77 Still, the decision to rely on

Hutto was a surprise. Perhaps, as a relatively recent judicial
appointee, Judge Cassell felt obliged to defer to the Tenth Circuit
for a clarification of Hutto's relevance to Eighth Amendment
doctrine. Or perhaps Judge Cassell simply was unable to choose
the morally clear path when faced with a clear conflict between
justice and the law.
Cassell's unusual post-sentencing actions show just how
strongly he felt about Angelos' case. After sentencing Angelos to
fifty-five years in prison, he stated that he "fe[lt] ethically
obligated to bring this injustice to the attention of those who are

72. Id. at 1257-58.
73. Id. at 1259.
74. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring and
citing majority holding that two consecutive twenty-year sentences for
marijuana possession did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
75. Judge Cassell himself notes that Hutto has been narrowed by Solem
v. Helm and later Eighth Amendment cases, but has not been overruled.
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d. at 1259.
76. Id. at 1259-60.
77. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-98 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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in a position to do something about it."78 In support of this, he
noted that "this is one of those rare cases where the system has
malfunctioned." 79 He sought relief for Angelos by communicating
his recommendation for executive clemency to the President
through the office of the Pardon Attorney.80 He asked the
President to commute the sentence to no more than eighteen
years, which was the average recommendation of the jurors.8 ' By
his actions, Judge Cassell conveyed the message that under any
theory of punishment, fifty-five years for Angelos was excessive
punishment.
Cassell also directed a plea to Congress to correct the
injustice of count-stacking by "repealing this feature and making
section 924(c) a true recidivist statute of the three-strikes-andyou're out variety."8 2 Enhancements would then apply only to
defendants who have been previously convicted of a serious
offense, rather than to first offenders like Angelos.
Angelos v. United States was argued in the Tenth Circuit on
November 14, 2005. An amicus brief filed on Angelos' behalf
raising the Eighth Amendment claim, signed by 163 individuals,8 3
reads like a "who's who" in criminal justice. Its signatories include
retired federal judges, former United States Attorneys and
Attorneys General, and other former high ranking United States
Department of Justice officials.8 4 They offer the Court of Appeals
arguments bolstered by hundreds of years of collective sentencing
78. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1261-62.
81. Id. at 1262. Judge Cassell could hardly have expected President
Bush to exercise his pardon power in Angelos's favor as this president has
granted clemency far less often than his predecessors. A recent Washington
Post editorial notes this dismal record of granting very few pardons and only
granting those with no political risk. See The Forgotten Power, WASH. POST,
Jan.3, 2006.
82. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
83. Brief for Greenberg Traurig, LLP, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendant-Appellant, United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 2006 WL
41211 (10th Cir. Jan. 9, 2006) (No. 04-4282) [hereinafter Brief for Greenberg
Traurig].
84. For example, signatories include former attorneys general Griffin
Bell, Janet Reno, Benjamin Civiletti, former U.S. attorneys Wayne Budd,
Zachary Carter, Jim Carrigan, Veronica Coleman-Davis, Robert DelTufo,
Roscoe Howard, Donald Stern, and federal judges Patricia Wald, and William
Sessions, totaling 163 former federal officials. Id. at 1-15.

552 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 11:537
expertise. They point out the paucity of cases where anyone
received such a severe sentence for a comparable crime, lending
support to the claim that the sentence violates society's evolving
standards of decency. They also look to factors relied on by the
Court, that is, the Angelos jury's sentencing recommendation, the
results of the Harmelin test, the actions of state legislatures in
reducing the punishment for marijuana possession,8 5 the ABA
report urging repeal of mandatory minimum sentences due to
unfairness and excessive severity, and the opinions of sentencing
experts.8 6 These are indicia of evolving standards that should be
part of a nationwide law of punishment.
VI.

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY

The Eighth Amendment exists against a backdrop of both its
own sparse doctrinal history and Congress' reaction to the
turbulent drug scares of the 1980's. The standard articulated in
Rummel v. Estelle is whether the sentence is "grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime."8 7 There, the Court

noted that "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of sentences have been extremely
rare."88 This has certainly been the case. However, it is important

to point out that when Rummel set this standard and asserted the
rarity of successful challenges, Congress had not yet enacted the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines nor had it begun its biennial
upward ratchet of all drug-related sentences, created hundreds of
new crimes, or established enhancement provisions and habitual
offender statutes. A court in 1980 could not have predicted what
was to become a revolution both in the severity of federal
85. Amici note that shortly after the Davis decision the Virginia
legislature reduced the maximum penalty for his offenses from forty to ten
years and governor Robb granted him a pardon so that he could not serve
more than twenty years in prison. Id. at 22. The defendant in Harmelin also
benefited from a change of heart by Michigan's legislature which amended
the statute by raising the quantity of drugs necessary for a life sentence and
by adding the possibility of parole. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §333.7403 (2001).
Life sentences for drug charges have been enacted in periods of passion, often
after little time for debate. This is precisely the kind of legislation where
courts can most aptly use their power of superintendence.
86. See Brief for Greenberg Traurig, supra note 83, at 22; Angelos, 345 F.
Supp. 2d at 1248-49.
87. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,271 (1980).
88. Id. at 272.
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sentencing and the reduction of judicial sentencing power.
Moreover, to say that successful challenges to term of year
sentences will be rare is not to say that they will never occur.
In Weems v. U.S., the Supreme Court asserted that the
Eighth Amendment "may be... progressive, and is not fastened to
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice." 9 Justice Stevens reminded us
more recently that the Eighth Amendment was not "frozen when
it was originally drafted." 90 Rather, the excessiveness of a
sentence is judged by standards of decency that currently prevail
and not those that prevailed when the Bill of Rights was written. 91
The logical question which follows is where the Court should look
to discover today's enlightened public opinion. According to
recurring pronouncements on the subject, proportionality review
must be guided by the following factors: "'the primacy of the
legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the
nature of our federal system, and the requirement that
proportionality review be guided by objective factors."' 92 While
these items offer some guidance, we must look further for an
answer, because legislatures are political entities and, therefore,
their actions do not tell a complete story.9 3 In capital cases, courts
have looked to juries for evolving standards on whether particular
classes of defendants may be executed. 94 However, the actions of
juries may not be helpful in our inquiry because juries generally
do not decide sentences. 95 Surely courts are not constrained in
89. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
90. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1205, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
91. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
92. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (quoting Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan).
93. State legislatures are closer to the pulse of the people than Congress
and therefore would seem to be a better measure of evolving standards of
decency. Federalism principles argue for more weight being given to state
legislatures than to Congress on Eighth Amendment issues. Courts may need
to be more deferential to state laws than to congressional acts. This argues
for the federal courts to conduct a searching inquiry to determine evolving
standards of decency so as to correctly apply the Eighth Amendment. See
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-99, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
94. See, e.g., Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 323
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Six states and the U.S. military have jury sentencing.
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their search for acquired meaning of the Eighth Amendment by
the political branches of government. 96 Courts are likely to be well
aware of the political intensity surrounding the presence of drugs
in society and, more importantly, are likely to be cognizant of the
lag between the ebb and flow of informed public opinion and
legislative action.
It is fair to say that today's social and political climate is
different, and less harsh toward crime and punishment, than that
of the previous two decades. Public opinion has softened with the
knowledge that extraordinarily long prison sentences for so many
people have exacted unwarranted financial and human costs.

97

96. Former Chief Justice Rehnquist commented that "mandatory
minimums.. .are frequently the result of floor amendments to demonstrate
emphatically that legislators want to 'get tough on crime.' Just as frequently,
they do not involve any careful consideration of the effect they might have on
the sentencing guidelines as a whole.. .they frustrate the careful calibration
of sentences... which the guidelines were intended to accomplish." David
Kopel, Policy Analysis: Prison Blues: How America's Foolish Sentencing
Policies Endanger Public Safety, Cato Policy Analysis No. 208, CATO

May 17, 1994, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-208.html.
There is increasing media attention to the tragic human costs of long

INSTITUTE,

97.

prison sentences. See Adam Liptak, Locked Away ForeverAfter Crimes as
Teenagers, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005 at Al, 16; Adam Liptak, To More Inmates,
Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at Al, 28. But,

despite a lessening in the number of executions, criminologist Franklin
Zimring predicts that current imprisonment rates will persist "as far as the
eye can see." Franklin Zimring, Speech at the Fourteenth World Congress of
Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania (Aug. 8, 2005). Studies
increasingly find racial bias in sentencing policies. See, e.g.,TuSHAR KANSAL,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING:

A REVIEW

OF THE

(Marc Mauer ed., Jan. 2005); Mike Billington, Analysis Points to
Bias in Sentencing, THE NEWS JOURNAL, July, 22, 2005. Judges bound by
mandatory sentencing laws increasingly express reservations about fairness
and equality in sentencing. Justice Anthony Kennedy, Speech at the ABA
Annual Meeting in San Francisco (2003); See also People v. Carmony, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 365, 379-80 (2005) (citing In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 10-11 (1976)
(The California Supreme Court struck down a sentence of ten years to life for
a sale of marijuana where the defendant had two prior drug offenses. "In so
doing, the court thought it 'particularly significant that [the] provisions for
recidivist narcotics offenders penalize broad ranges of conduct and widely
differing types of offenders without distinction, requiring substantial
enhanced mandatory prison terms because of prior offenses regardless of
their temporal remoteness, lack of relevance to the new offense, or relative
gravity.' The court concluded that the enhanced penalties for repeated
violations are suspect to the extent they limit the sentencing authority's
ability to recognize gradations of culpability.")); U.S. SENTENCING
LITERATURE

COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF
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Judge Cassell and counsel for Angelos recounted examples of
these changes: the jury's straw vote on an appropriate sentence,
Justice Kennedy's comments to the ABA against mandatory
sentencing, and the ABA's own report calling for repeal of
mandatory minimum sentencing laws. 98 There are additional
signs of change. More than a dozen states have passed reforms
scaling back mandatory minimum sentences, expanding drug
treatment as an option over incarceration, and offering
alternatives to incarceration for low level offenders. 99 Public and
private actors are rethinking punishment and expanding the
inventory of evolving standards. 100 Consider the following:
How WELL THE FEDERAL

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF

138
(2004),
available
at
http://nicic.org(Misc/URLShell.aspx?SRC=Catalog&REFF=http://nicic.orgLib
rary/020121&ID=020121&TYPE=HTML& URL=http://www.ussc.gov/15_year
15year.htm (noting the "steady accretion of guideline enhancements," that
"Congress frequently has directed the Commission to add aggravating
adjustments to a wide variety of guidelines," and that "political pressure to
respond to public concerns over high publicity crimes could result in frequent
revision of the guidelines without a sound policy basis").
98. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1262; Brief of Appellant Angelos, supra
note 53, at 14-15 (citing ABA Justice Kennedy Commission Report, supra
note 44).
SENTENCING

99.

REFORM

See Cheryl W. Thompson, Incarceration Policies Eased, 2 Reports

Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2002, at A2. States are either reducing or removing
mandatory penalties due to budget constraints. See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN &
TONY FABELO, THE JFA INSTITUTE, THE DIMINISHING RETURNS OF INCREASED
A BLUEPRINT TO IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY AND REDUCE COSTS
(2004); Alexander Marks, More States Roll Back Mandatory Drug Sentences,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 10, 2004; see also VINCENT SCHIRALDI, JASON
INCARCERATION,

COLBURNE, & ERIC LOTKE, THE JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THREE STIKES AND

YOU'RE OUT (2004) ("[M]ore than half of all states have changed sentencing
laws, abolished mandatory sentences, or reformed parole policies to ease
crowding and reduce their incarceration rates." States that are downsizing
their penal policies show no rise in crime); Todd R. Clear, Backfire: When
IncarcerationIncreases Crime, OKLA. CRIM. JUST. RES. CONSORTIUM J. (Aug.
1996); Connecticut Lawmakers Urge Shorter Prison Stays, CONNECTICUT
Now, June 27, 2003 (Public opinion increasingly favors treatment for non
violent drug offenders);
Dina Temple-Raston, Red Hook Target
Misdemeanors, NEW YORK SUN, Sept. 21, 2004.
100. See
THE
BOSTON
FOUNDATION,
RETHINKING
JUSTICE
IN
MASSACHUSETTS: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (2005).

"Massachusetts residents overwhelmingly oppose mandatory minimum
sentencing." Id. at 14. Currently there are proposals to limit mandatory
sentencing before the Massachusetts legislature. William J. Leahy, Chief
Counsel for Committee for Public Counsel Services, Testimony Concerning
Sentencing Reform (May 21, 2003) (denouncing mandatory sentencing as "a
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1. A recent study shows no connection between mandatory
sentencing and the reduction of crime;1 0'
2. Violent crime declined in the 1990's, partly due to a greatly
reduced crack market.102 As stated above and elsewhere, the crack
epidemic is what triggered both the widespread fear of violence
10 3
and mandatory sentencing;
3. Numerous opinion polls in recent years show a fall-off in
support for long prison sentences and new interest in a balanced
approach that focuses on prevention, rehabilitation, and other
remedies. 104
4. The U.S. Sentencing Commission has expressed concern
about sentence equality and inordinate prosecutorial control of
sentencing.105
5. Academics and criminal justice professionals around the
world are calling for reform of sentencing for non-violent drug
offenses;

106

6. The Supreme Court's recent sentencing cases have
federal sentencing,
generated calls for reconsideration of
10 7
including mandatory minimums;
public policy nightmare: ineffective at preserving the public safety, and
recklessly wasteful as fiscal policy").
101. Raymond Bonner & Ford Fessenden, States With No Death Penalty
Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2000, at Al.
102. Fox Butterfield, Decline of Violent Crimes Is Linked to Crack Market,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998, at A18 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics report
released Dec. 27, 1998).
103. Id.
104. Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., THE OPEN SOCIETY
INSTITUTE,

CHANGING

PUBLIC

ATTITUDES TOWARD

THE

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

19 (2002); See The Sentencing Project, Crime, Punishment and
Public Opinion: A Summary of Recent Studies and Their Implications for
Sentencing Policy (2001), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org
/pdfs/1005.pdf (noting that the public is generally misinformed on crime and
crime policy, that public opinion is more complex than policymakers assume
and that the public embraces alternative sentencing options when offered.).
105. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS (2002); See also Laurie P. Cohen, In Federal Cases,
Big Gap in Rewards for Cooperation,WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2004, at Al, A9.
106. See, e.g., Alvin J. Bronstein, Director Emeritus ACLU National
Prison Project, Incarceration as a Failed Policy, CORRECTIONS TODAY 6
(August 2005); JUDITH GREENE & TIMOTHY ROCHE, THE JUSTICE POLICY
IN MARYLAND (2003); JuDITH GREENE &
INSTITUTE, CUTTING CORRECTLY
SYSTEM

VINCENT SCHIRALDI, THE JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, CUTTING CORRECTLY: NEW

POLICIES FOR TIMES OF FISCAL CRISIS (2002).

107.

See, e.g., Letter from James Finckenauer, President, The Academy of
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7. The Supreme Court's recent rulings reflect changing social
norms on executing juveniles and the mentally ill;108
8. Referenda and legislation in at least nine states have
allowed the medical use of marijuana for treatment of certain
serious illnesses; 109
9. There is increasing evidence of the dehumanization that
occurs during long prison stays where mental illness and brutality
are rampant;" 0
10. Former federal judges and prosecutors are actively
criticizing federal sentencing policy; the fact that so many signed
on as amici in this case, and on numerous other cases around the
country, serves to signal that nationwide punishment norms are
becoming less punitive;"'
11. States have responded to escalating prison costs by
adopting alternatives, such as requiring fiscal planning for each

Criminal Justice Sciences, et. al., to Hon. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary and Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Ranking
Member, House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Pursuing
Meaningful Sentencing Reform (Jan. 12, 2005) (calling for thorough
evaluation of federal sentencing policy including the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences).
108. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002); But see recent jury decision that Atkins was not retarded
and is therefore suitable for execution. Maria Glod, Va. Killer Isn't Retarded,
Jury Says; Execution Set: Case PromptedSupreme Court Ruling, WASH. POST,

Aug. 6, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdynlcontent/article/2005/08/05/AR2005080501306.html.
109. The states noted are Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine,
Nevada, Oregon, Vermont and Washington. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct.
2195, 2198 (2005). Angelos's attorneys argues this in support of his getting
over Harmelin's threshold crime severity requirement, pointing out that
marijuana has been decriminalized in a number of states and is a minor
citation offense in others. Brief of Appellant Angelos, supra note 53, at 24.
110. See Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons, Mission
Statement,
www.prisoncommission.org/mission.asp. "Our goal for this
Commission is to spark and inform broad public dialogue on safety and abuse
in America's prisons and the consequences for prisoners, corrections officers,
and all of American society." Id. (quoting Nicholas de B. Katzenbach). "In one
year alone, there were 34,355 assaults by state and federal prisoners against
other inmates, and 51 prisoners died as a result of those violent actions."
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons, Frequently Asked
Questions About the Commission, http://www.prisoncommission.org/faq. asp
(citing the Bureau of Justice Statistics) (last visited on Jan. 21, 2006).
111. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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proposed increase in sentencing. 112 Other states are increasing the
113
use of parole.
Implicit in Judge Cassell's repeated characterization of
Angelos' sentence as unfair, unjust, irrational, cruel and unusual
is his acceptance of the concepts of desert, decency and dignity
that the Supreme Court has said are at the core of the Eighth
Amendment in Weems and Trop. Judge Cassell began his
proportionality analysis by applying Harmelin's threshold test.
First he looked to the nature of the crime and its relation to the
punishment imposed.1 4 He stated that:
[i]n weighing the gravity of the offenses, the court should
consider the offenses of conviction and the defendant's
criminal history, as well as the 'harm caused or
threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of
the offender.' Simply put, 'disproportionality analysis
measures the relationship between the nature and
number of offenses committed and the severity of the
punishment inflicted upon the offender."' 5
The judge found the sentence-triggering conduct of possessing
a barely visible handgun while selling small amounts of
marijuana to be modest. 1 6 The same was true for the guns found
in Angelos' home." 7 His description of the crimes as modest took
into account the fact that Angelos engaged in no force or violence
and he did not injure, or threaten to injure, anyone." 8 All of these
facts directly relate to society's interest in punishing Angelos. 119
112.

See e.g. North Carolina's 'fiscal notes' policy. Ben Trachtenberg, State

Sentencing Policy and New PrisonAdmission, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 479, 506-

12 (2005).
113. See Robert Moran, Drop in N.J.'s Prison Population Defies Trend,
THE PHIL. INQ., May 11, 2005 (after years of hard-line policies on
lawbreakers, New Jersey is following a more measured, reasonable course.);
See also Minnesota Sentencing Commission Report Says State Could Save $30
Million per year with Treatment Not Prison, Jan. 23, 2004,

http://stopthedrugwar.orgchronicle/321/minnesota.shtml.
Visit www.msgc.
state.mn.us to read the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
Special Report on Drug Offender Sentencing.
114. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1257 (D. Utah 2004).
115. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292-94 (1983)).
116.

Id. at 1258.

117. Id.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
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The Court found that Angelos easily satisfied Harmelin's other
two steps in the proportionality analysis: comparisons to penalties
for other offenses and comparisons to other jurisdictions. 120
It is hard to find a case that so clearly calls to mind the
admonitions of Weems. There, as in Angelos, the Court was
concerned about the relatively minor nature of the crimes, the
length of the minimum term, and the fact that the enhancements
were so much more severe than the possible punishment for the
primary crimes. 12 1 Angelos' mandatory penalty for the first gun
possession was five years. His mandatory penalty for the other
two gun charges was fifty years. Unlike defendants in other cases
decided by the Supreme Court under enhanced penalty statutes, 122
Angelos had no opportunity to be deterred from criminal conduct
by previous convictions. He had no prior convictions. He went
from a clean record to a virtual life sentence based less on his
crimes than on the method of his arrest and prosecution. Congress
could not have intended such a harsh result from an enhancement
law. 123 Of course, no one penalogical theory need be adopted by
Congress.124 However, even the harshest state recidivist laws
have either deterrence or incapacitation as their goals. Neither
makes sense here.
Judge Cassell went against his own findings in part because
he believed he had to defer to Congress. It is worth noting,
however, that he did not face the same federalism issues that
confronted the Supreme Court in all the major Eighth
Amendment cases, because the statute at issue in Angelos is not a
state law. The presumption of constitutionality may be narrower
when legislation appears on its face to be within the first ten

120. Id. at 1258-59.
121. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
122. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29-30 (1979). In its most recent
pronouncement on the Eighth Amendment the Court noted that it was
reasonable to give harsher punishment to one "who by repeated criminal acts
[has] shown that [he is] simply incapable of conforming to the norms of
society as established by its criminal law." Id. at 29.
123. Justice Stevens makes this point in his dissent in Deal v. United
States, saying that "it is absurd to think that Congress intended to treat such
a defendant as a repeat offender, subject to penalty enhancement...." 508
U.S. 129, 138 (1993).
124. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,999 (1991).
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amendments to the Constitution.125 Furthermore, it is within the
Court's purview to consider that § 924(c) was enacted during an
intensely political era marked by the war on drugs. 126 Also, in a
1998 case, United States v. Bajakajian, brought under the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, the Supreme Court held
that forfeiture of more than $350,000 was extraordinarily harsh
and grossly disproportionate to the offense in question. 127 There
the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of arriving at a
precise punishment with so little guidance on "how
disproportional a punitive forfeiture must be to the gravity of an
offense in order to be 'excessive.' Excessive means surpassing the
usual, the proper, or a normal measure of proportion." 28 The
Supreme Court found little guidance in either the text of the
Eighth Amendment or Constitutional history, noting that the
prohibition against excessive fines was a response to British
abuses. 129 This is no less true for the prohibition against excessive
punishment."30 The Supreme Court turns for its answer to the
Eighth Amendment standard enunciated in Solem v. Helm,
comparing the amount of the forfeiture (which the Court said was
clearly punitive) to the gravity of the defendant's crime.' 3 ' The
Court also considered, as did Judge Cassell in Angelos, what the
punishment would be under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in
order to confirm the defendant's minimal level of culpability. 132
Additionally, the Supreme Court considered the harm the
defendant caused to the victim and society and found that "[the
fine sought by the government bore] no articulable correlation to
any injury suffered by the Government." 33 There is no persuasive
125. Brief of Appellant Angelos, supra note 53, at 57 (citing United States
v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
126. See United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D.R.I. 2005).
127. 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).
128. Id. at 335
129. Id.
130. See id. at 336-37.
131. Id. at 331-32, 334.
132. Id. at 338; see United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1232
(D. Utah 2004).
133. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339-40. The Court's analysis under the
Solem/Harmelin threshold test is strongly reminiscent of that done by Judge
Cassell in Angelos. In an effort to demonstrate the gross disproportionality of
the fine, the Court says "It is impossible to conclude... that the harm
respondent caused is anywhere near 30 times greater than that caused by a
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reason why the courts cannot apply the same kind of gross
disproportionality analysis to term of years sentences that it
applied to fines in Bajakajian. The draconian federal sentencing
scheme at issue here, either as written or as applied by the
government, has not been subjected to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny by the Supreme Court. Applying the federal sentencing
scheme to Weldon Angelos for these charges was distinctly cruel
134
and unusual.
Judge Cassell opened the door to renewed consideration of
evolving standards by gathering information from jurors. He cited
changing norms and drew support from many sources, yet, despite
acknowledged changes, he bowed to dubious precedent and
135
rejected the Eighth Amendment challenge.
VII. CONCLUSION

When determinate sentencing eliminated the trial judge's
face-to-face calculation of deserved punishment, it stunted Eighth
Amendment doctrine. No longer did the trial judge ensure
Constitutional fidelity and act as a gatekeeper against unjust
punishment. Judge Cassell's frustration with his lack of power to
do justice was palpable. He said not once, but many times, that
the sentence was cruel and unjust, and unusual, to the extent that
hypothetical drug dealer who willfully fails to report taking $12,000 out of
the country in order to purchase drugs." Id. at 339.
134. Judge Cassell and commentators are critical of the amount of
discretion possessed by federal prosecutors on whether to 'go federal' in a case
where there is equivalent state law and on what charges to press. This is
particularly salient in cases involving drugs. See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at
1253; see generally Michael Edmund O'Neill, When ProsecutorsDon't: Trends
in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 221 (2003).
Counsel and the Court raise one of the most criticized standards of decency
points regarding the circumstances of the Angelos arrest. The trap was set
over time, perhaps to ensure his eligibility for a life sentence. The informant
didn't report the guns until at least the second set of interviews with his
police employers, and the third gun was seized months after the drug sales.
The prosecutor's offer of fifteen years for a guilty plea at least suggests that
he didn't think Angelos deserved to be imprisoned forever. His refusal to
reopen plea negotiations after getting new complaints added to the overall
picture of indecency presented by this case. Federal prosecutors have nearly
total control over sentencing, a fact that has generated criticism even in
Congress. See, e.g., Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1253, Brief of Amici Curiae,
supranote 35, at 22.
135. Brief of Appellant Angelos, supra note 53, at 36.
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neither counsel nor the Court found anything like it anywhere in
the country.
Courts generally struggle with defining excessive punishment
because it appears to be easily manipulated or, even worse,
conflated with the personal predilections of judges. Obvious
doctrinal gaps appear when one seeks to define Harmelin's
threshold test and tries to determine the point at which evolving
standards of decency demand less punishment. 136 The Supreme
Court has said that evolving standards should be measured as
much as possible by objective factors. As discussed in Part VI, one
can see that such factors are observable, measurable and ready to
be incorporated into Eighth Amendment doctrine. Judge Cassell,
counsel for Angelos and distinguished Amici argue that standards
of decency have evolved to the point where this sentence is unduly
harsh. 137 Laws that may have been just when enacted, are
recognized now as too costly. Times change and standards change
with them. It is time to clarify the contours of the Eighth
Amendment. The Court has begun this with excessive fines in
Bajakajian.
The Tenth Circuit could have provided relief to Angelos in a
number of ways. 138 It could have reversed the lower court by
136. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 64 (2003). This was the
companion case to Ewing, upholding California's three-strike law. Id. at 77.
137. Counsel and the Court raise one of the most criticized standards of
decency points regarding the circumstances of the Angelos arrest. The trap
was set over time, perhaps to ensure his eligibility for a life sentence, the
informant didn't report the guns until at least the second set of interviews
with his police employers, and the third gun was seized months after the
drug sales. See, e.g., Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-32, 1254. The
prosecutor's offer of fifteen years for a guilty plea at least suggests that he
didn't think Angelos deserved to be imprisoned forever. His refusal to reopen
plea negotiations after getting new complaints added to the overall picture of
indecency presented by this case. Federal prosecutors have nearly total
control over sentencing, a fact that has generated criticism even in Congress.
138. As this article was being prepared for publication, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit handed down its opinion in United
States v. Angelos. 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006). The panel of three judges
affirmed both the convictions and the sentence. Despite affirming the
sentence, the Court took pains to review the Eighth Amendment issue de
novo, and in doing so took issue with Judge Cassell's proportionality analysis
as well as his characterization of Angelos's crimes. The Court disputed Judge
Cassell's calling this an extraordinary case and did not find the sentence to
be grossly disproportionate to the crimes. The Court credited § 924(c) as
accurately reflecting Congress' concern with the dangers that flowed from the
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declaring that Hutto is no longer useful in Eighth Amendment
analysis while at the same time accepting the Tenth Circuit's
previous Harmelin findings. It could have avoided addressing the
constitutional questions by deciding that Congress never intended
that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) be charged consecutively against a first
offender in a simple non-violent drug case such as this one,
139
thereby distinguishing these facts from those in Deal.
Alternatively, the Court could have decided that consecutive
sentences of fifty-five years in a single prosecution under 28
U.S.C. § 924(c) violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, an issue that the Court
did not reach in Deal. Notably, Angelos is precisely the kind of
claimant the Supreme Court has said deserves special protection.
As stated by counsel, "it is hard to conceive of a more 'discrete and
insular minority' than drug offenders like Weldon Angelos; not
only are they effectively unrepresented and their interests totally
ignored in the legislative process, but such individuals can be
disenfranchised after conviction and often serve as political
140
scapegoats for all that ails society."
A life sentence for Weldon Angelos shocks the conscience of
the community and offends our deepest notions of human dignity.
The Tenth Circuit should have acted to uphold the deep respect
for human dignity that is at the heart of the Eighth Amendment.
This case presents a perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to
correct both a tragic injustice to Weldon Angelos and a void in
Eighth Amendment doctrine.

combination of drugs and guns. The Court recognized the continuing viability
of Hutto v. Davis, and concluded that "the Supreme Court has never held that
a sentence to a specific term of years, even if it might turn out to be more
than the reasonable life expectancy of the defendant, constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment." Id. at 753 (citing United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d
516, 537 (6th Cir. 2003)). Defendant's options are to ask for a rehearing
before the full bench of the Tenth Circuit or to appeal directly to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The analysis and commentary set forth in this paper would
be equally applicable should either of these circumstances occur.
139. Brief of Appellant Angelos, supra note 53, at 59-65 (see discussion of
rules of lenity and statutory construction).
140. Id. at 58. This is particularly important given the highly politicized
atmosphere that produced these drug laws.

